Thoughts on the new strategic calculus in foreign policy

especially when the standard unit for what constitutes a national-level, existential threat has decreased in size from nation v. nation in 1942 to nation v. (well-financed) rotary club in 2011. This is a result of our developments in science and technology that have exponentially expanded individual productivity in every arena of human endeaver, including its destructive capacity.

Currently, foreign policy making seeks to manage control of human populations only down to the level where they can be considered a threat to national security. In the 20th century, the enormous amount of resources it took to wage existential war meant that the only viable threats to nations came from other nations. Policy makers made their deals accordingly. Under this calculus, endorsing strongmen who can deliver a non-threat population ensures the security of the nation to because it limits the size of any potential opposition below the level of national threat--even while it guarantees some level of opposition by its nature. In other words, if it takes ten men to beat you, you can still win by pissing off only nine of them.

But in an era where 10 men can threaten 300 million, we need to re-evaluate that calculus. How long can we continue to operate even the smallest sized of these opposition factories when it takes so few to make so much destruction?

few disaffected souls to




The dominant paradigm of foreign policy was petrified around the notion that

Our developments in science and technology have exponentially expanded the human productivity in every arena of human endeaver, including its destructive capacity. Ironically, this shift in efficiency, which was pursued by nations to increase their power, may cause the end of nationalism altogether.



bought and paid for by a drive for national power, may cause the end of nationalism altogether.


nation-states by the n insatiable persuit of power by nations, will be the death of nationalism.

as information and technology have escilated the destructive capacity of the individual vis a vis its society. This shift in efficiency, while driven by the insatiable persuits of national power, will be the death of nationalism.


when the technical capacity of the individual exceeds the ability of forensic science to investigate, the few will destroy everything. imagine if you could program a mite-sized program to leave travel to your competitors store of its own volition and attack it; now imagine 10,000 mites.

Stuff like this is evidence that the dominant paradigm for global stability that has shaped foreign policy for everybody's lifetimes is beginning to crumble. We used to base our

there was a rate of exchange which says we will tolerate

Decisions were made about

the

Foreign policy making sought to manage control of populations down to the level where they can be considered a threat to national security. In the 20th century, the enormous amount of resources it took to wage existential war meant that the only viable threats to nations came from other nations. Under this calculus, endorsing strongmen who can deliver a non-threat population ensures the security of the nation to the extent it limits the size of the potential opposition. In other words, if it takes ten men to beat you, you can still win by pissing off only nine of them.

But the advance through modernity is beginning to change the math underpinning the entire security market. The developments of science and technology have exploded individual productivity, not only in business but in every arena of human endeavor, including its destructive capacity. If we now live in a world where 10 individuals can threaten 300 million, how many disaffected and disfunctional global citizens can we afford to create as the price for our autocratic buffer?

That means the world is probably going to get scarier in the short term. Imagine a room full of people where each individual had the capacity to end them all.


can we continue to support a system that



Correcting the calculations of national security will need to account


We can't keep making foreign policy through the paradigm which measure only national threats.

In that case, we can no longer rely on the efficacy of top-down control. We'll need to look to a much messier dynamic like individual buy-in.


technology has changed the math.


is a social good

with regards to ensuring the security of the nation.



The buffer autocracies are valuable to the central power to the extent they can prevent enough human and financial





get away with pissing off nine of them.

These buffer autocracies serve to lock down large swaths of the available financial and human resources that might have been used by national enemies; ultimately to become resources to be used against them.

However, the growth of human technology has begun to challenge the value of that exchange.



If we can no longer rely on top-down control, we need to put our faith in bottom-up participation.



Making foreign policy decisions based on controlling